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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - School Board's Exclusive
Access Policy to Teacher Mailboxes Does Not Violate
Rights of Minority Union. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local
Educators'Ass'n, 103 S. Ct. 948 (1983).
In Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educators'
Association' the United States Supreme Court ruled that a
school board could grant the recognized teacher union ac-
cess to the school system's internal mail facilities while ex-
cluding a rival union. The majority2 held that the mail
system was not a public forum to which the rival union had
a first amendment3 right of access, 4 and that the differential
treatment was reasonably justified by the official duties of
the recognized bargaining representative and by the alterna-
tive means of communication available to the minority
union.5 In addition, since the rival union had no fundamen-
tal right of access to the mail system, a grant of access to the
recognized union did not violate the equal protection clause 6
of the fourteenth amendment.7
Justice Brennan dissented8 from the Perry Education
holding, maintaining that the first amendment's prohibition
against governmental discrimination on the basis of a
speaker's message or identity afforded protection of all pub-
lic property.9 He argued that the effect of the exclusive ac-
cess policy was discrimination between union viewpoints,
and that there was no legitimate state interest in denying the
rival union equal access.' 0
1. 103 S. Ct. 948 (1983).
2. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court in which Chief Justice Burger
and Justices Blackmun, O'Connor and Rehnquist joined.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. I provides: "Congress shall make no law. .. abridging
the freedom of speech .
4. 103 S. Ct. at 957.
5. Id. at 958-59.
6. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, provides: "No State shall make or enforce any
law which shall. . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws."
7. 103 S. Ct. at 959-60.
8. Justices Marshall, Powell and Stevens joined in the dissent.
9. 103 S. Ct. at 964 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
10. Id. at 965-68.
[Vol. 67:757
EXCLUSIVE ACCESS POLICY
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Metropolitan School District of Perry Township, In-
diana, utilized an interschool mail delivery system in order
to transmit official messages to teachers and administrators
within its thirteen schools." The district also permitted
teachers and, with prior approval, various community orga-
nizations to use the mail system for their own benefit. 12 In
addition, both teacher unions, the Perry Education Associa-
tion (PEA) and the Perry Local Educators' Association
(PLEA), were allowed access to the system's individual mail
slots. 13
However, in 1977, PLEA challenged PEA's status as the
de facto bargaining representative for the Perry Township
teachers. PEA won the election, was formally certified as
exclusive bargaining representative,' 4 and subsequently ne-
gotiated a labor contract with the school board.' 5 The con-
tract provided that PEA be permitted access to the
individual mail slots, that PEA be permitted use of the inter-
school mail system to the extent the school district incurred
no extra expense by such use, and that PEA be the only
teacher union granted such rights.' 6 However, the contract
did not prevent PLEA from using other school facilities to
communicate with the teachers.' 7
PLEA brought suit against PEA and the members of the
board, seeking access to the mail system. Upon cross-mo-
tions for summary judgment, the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Indiana entered judgment
11. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 103 S. Ct. 948, 951-52
(1983).
12. Id. at 952. The Court stated: "Local parochial schools, church groups,
YMCA's, and Cub Scout units have used the system." Id. at 952 n.2.
13. Id. at 952. For a discussion of the growth of collective bargaining among
teachers, see generally Gee, The Unionization of Mr. Chips: A Survey Analysis of Col-
ledie Bargaining in the Public Schools, 15 WILLAMETTE L.J. 367 (1979).
14. See IND. CODE § 20-7.5-1-2(1) (1976).
15. Perry Education, 103 S. Ct. at 952. The contract was renewed in 1980 and
was in force at the time of the Supreme Court's decision. .d.
16. Id. For the exact language of the contract provisions, see Perry Local Educa-
tors' Ass'n v. Hohlt, 652 F.2d 1286, 1288 n.1 (7th Cir. 1981).
17. Perry Education, 103 S. Ct. at 952. These facilities included schoo: bulletin
boards, classrooms after school hours, and, with the prior approval of the school prin-
cipals, the public address systems. Id.
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for PEA and the school board members. 8 The court held
that there was no material infringement on PLEA's first
amendment rights because the mail system was not a public
forum and because PLEA had numerous alternative means
of communicating with the teachers.' 9 The court then held
that the exclusive access policy was rationally related to the
goal of preserving labor peace within the school system and,
therefore, the policy did not violate the equal protection
clause.20
PLEA appealed and the Seventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals reversed.2' The court found that the exclusive access
policy was a form of censorship favoring PEA's viewpoint
over that of PLEA.2 2 The court then held that neither PEA's
special legal duties to the teachers nor the mere claim of pro-
moting labor peace justified the school board's differential
treatment. Therefore, the policy violated both the equal pro-
tection clause and the first amendment as incorporated into
the fourteenth. 3 The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari.2 4 In a five-to-four decision, the Court reversed the
court of appeals and held that PLEA did not have a funda-
mental right of access to the school's internal mail facilities
under either the first amendment or the equal protection
clause.25
II. BACKGROUND
A. Standard of Review
In scrutinizing the government's justifications for its pol-
icy or regulation, the Supreme Court's selection of the stan-
18. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n v. Hohlt, 652 F.2d 1286, 1289 (7th Cir. 1981).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1302.
22. Id. at 1294.
23. Id. at 1300.
24. PEA appealed under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(2) (1976) which grants the Supreme
Court appellate jurisdiction when a federal court of appeals has held a state statute
repugnant to the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States. The Court dis-
missed for want of jurisdiction because the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held
that certain contract provisions, and not the state statute authorizing them, were un-
constitutional. Perry Education, 103 S. Ct. at 953-54. The dissent agreed. Id. at 960
n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
25. 103 S. Ct. at 960.
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dard of review will generally determine the success of the
plaintiff's constitutional challenge.26 The Court's choice is
between either strict tests, which usually favor the chal-
lenger, or more lenient tests that favor the government. 27
The Court has not, however, clearly defined the boundaries
between these tests.
Under a first amendment analysis in which the challenge
is based upon government abridgement of one's freedom of
speech, the Supreme Court will usually apply a strict or rig-
orous scrutiny test when the restrictions are directed at
speech "intimately related to the process of governing. ' 28
The government must then show that its justifications are
compelling and that its regulation is the least speech-restric-
tive means of achieving its legitimate goals.29 In other situa-
tions, the Court has applied a lower standard. This looser
test requires the government to show that its regulation is no
more restrictive than is reasonably necessary to protect the
government's interest. °
Under an equal protection analysis in which the chal-
lenge is based upon discriminatory governmental classifica-
tions among groups, the Supreme Court will usually apply a
strict scrutiny test when the government's policy discrimi-
nates on the basis of the content of the speech or the identity
of the speaker.31 The government must then show a compel-
ling interest for the differential treatment and that the classi-
fication policy is the least restrictive means of effecting its
goals.32 When no fundamental right, such as freedom of
speech, is involved and the classification is not otherwise sus-
26. See Emerson, First Amendment Doctrine and the Burger Court, 68 CALIF. L.
REv. 422 (1980).
27. See Comment, Competing Teacher Associations and School Mailboxes: A
Right ofEqualAccess - Perry Local Educators' Ass'n v. Hohlt, 58 CHI.-KENT L. REv.
1085, 1091-95 (1982).
28. First Natl Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978).
29. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976).
30. United States Postal Serv. v. Greenburgh Civic Ass'n, 453 U.S. 114, 131 n.7
(1981).
31. See, e.g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980); Police Dep't of Chicago v.
Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
32. Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 98-99 (1972).
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pect, the Court will apply the rationale basis test.33 The gov-
ernment's policy then need only rationally further some
legitimate state purpose.34
B. Content Neutrality
The content neutrality principle focuses on the first
amendment's "central proscription" against government
censorship. It allows the government to reasonably restrict
speech without regard to the message or identity of the
speaker, that is, when the restriction is content-neutral.36
But this principle presumes a violation of the first amend-
ment when the government's regulation is based on the
speaker's message or identity, that is, when the restriction is
content-based.37
The Supreme Court has previously applied the content
neutrality concept when analyzing cases of unequal access to
public property. In Niemotko v. Maryland38 the Court re-
versed a disorderly conduct conviction in a case in which a
religious group's permit applications for parking were re-
peatedly denied while those of other religious organizations
had always been granted. In Police Department of Chicago v.
Mosley39 the Court invalidated a city ordinance which al-
lowed peaceful picketing near schools if it pertained to a
school's labor dispute but prohibited all other peaceful pick-
eting. In City of Madison Joint School District v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Commission40 the Supreme Court in-
validated an order which prohibited anyone, except union
representatives, from speaking at a public school board
meeting on matters subject to collective bargaining. In Ca-
33. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (classification distinguishing
on basis of race is suspect); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948) (classification
distinguishing on basis of national origin is suspect).
34. See San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973).
35. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 877 (1982) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
36. See Stone, Restrictions of Speech Because ofits Content: The Peculiar Case of
Subject Matter Restrictions, 46 U. CHI. L. Rnv. 81, 81-83 (1978).
37. Id.
38. 340 U.S. 268 (1951).
39. 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
40. 429 U.S. 167 (1976).
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rey v. Brownn41 the Court held unconstitutional a state statute
which prohibited all peaceful picketing on public streets and
sidewalks in residential neighborhoods, but which allowed
peaceful labor picketing. Finally, in Widmar v. Vincent 42 the
Court struck down a regulation which made a university's
facilities generally available for the activities of registered
student groups but denied them to a registered religious
group. It must be noted, however, that each of the above
cases also involved restricted access to public forums.
C. Public Forum Doctrine
The Supreme Court has evaluated limitations on access
to public property on the basis of the property's character.
This "public forum"43 analysis has fashioned three catego-
ries, each with a varying degree of permissible restrictions on
the freedom of speech. The traditional public forum is prop-
erty, such as "streets, sidewalks, parks, and other similar
public places," 44 which is available for use by the general
public and which has, historically, been used for the exercise
of first amendment rights.45  Content-neutral regulations of
the time, place, and manner of expression are enforceable in
these forums only when such restrictions are narrowly drawn
to serve a significant governmental interest and permit ac-
cess to other adequate alternative channels of communica-
tion.46  Content-based regulations can be enforced only
when they are "finely tailored to serve substantial state inter-
ests, and the justifications offered for any distinctions [they
draw] must be carefully scrutinized." 47
41. 447 U.S. 455 (1980).
42. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
43. See generally Cass, First Amendment Access to Government Facilities, 65 VA.
L. REv. 1287 (1979); Homing, The First Amendment Right to a Public Forum, 1969
DUKE L.J. 931; Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965
Sup. CT. REv. 1; Newell, Use of Campus Facilitiesfor First Amendment Activity, 9 J.
C. & U. L. 27 (1982-83); Stone, Fora Amerieana: Speech in Public Places, 1974 SuP.
CT. REV. 233.
44. Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc.,
391 U.S. 308, 315 (1968).
45. Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (opinion of Roberts, J.).
46. See, e.g., United States Postal Serv. v. Greenburgh Civic Ass'n, 453 U.S. 114,
132 (1981).
47. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461-62 (1980).
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The second category contains more places and more per-
missible restrictions than the first. The limited public forum
is property generally open to the public for communicative
purposes or "purposes closely linked to expression." 48 These
forums include public schools, 49 public governmental meet-
ings,50 state fairs, 51 municipal theaters,52 public libraries,53
and other similar places. Limited public forums may be re-
stricted by the same rules concerning content-neutral and
content-based regulations that are applicable to traditional
public forums. 4 If created for a limited purpose, these fo-
rums may also be restricted to the physical areas used to ad-
vance that purpose,55 for discussion of subjects related to the
purpose,56 or to use by groups associated with the purpose.57
The manner of the speech must not be "incompatible with
the normal activity" of the particular property. 8
Public property which is neither of the traditional nor of
the limited forum character is designated a nonpublic forum.
This category is the most removed from first amendment
protection. These forums include postal letterboxes, 59 mili-
tary bases,60 advertising space on public transits, 61 and jail-
house grounds.62 The state may preserve the property for its
lawfully dedicated use, including a use specifically for com-
municative purposes, 63 by prohibiting any form of commu-
48. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 690 (1978).
49. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
50. See City of Madison Joint School Dist. v. Wisconsin Pub. Employment Rela-
tions Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167 (1976).
51. See Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S.
640 (1981).
52. See Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975).
53. See Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966).
54. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269-70 (1981).
55. Id. at 273 n.5 (1981).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972).
59. See United States Postal Serv. v. Greenburgh Civic Ass'n, 453 U.S. 114
(1981).
60. See Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828
(1976).
61. See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
62. See Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
63. Unites States Postal Serv. v. Greenburgh Civic Ass'n, 453 U.S. 114, 130 n.6
(1981).
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nication in a reasonable and content-neutral manner.64
III. THE PERRY EDUCATION OPINIONS
A. The Majority
Writing for the majority in Perry, Justice White focused
on the character of the property and the status of each union.
"The First Amendment's guarantee of free speech applies to
teachers' mailboxes as surely as it does elsewhere within the
school," 65 but the right of access to a particular area will de-
pend upon the nature of the forum.66 The Court concluded
that the school's mail system is a nonpublic forum because:
the system could be closed to all but official business; it was,
in fact, not held open to the general public; and, its function
was to facilitate internal communication of school-related
matters.67 The use of the system by private community orga-
nizations did not make the property a limited public fo-
rum.68 These outside groups needed prior permission which
was not shown to have been granted as a matter of course.69
PLEA's prior unrestricted access to the system did not
make the property a limited public forum generally open for
use by school employee organizations.70  The previous
equal-access policy was consistent with the district's preser-
vation of the facilities for school-related business because
both unions represented teachers and had legitimate reasons
for such use.71 The subsequent exclusive-access policy was
based on the present status of each union rather than on
their views.72 "Implicit in the concept of the nonpublic fo-
rum is the right to make distinctions in access on the basis of
subject matter and speaker identity. ' 73 The school board
64. Id. at 131 n.7.
65. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 103 S. Ct. 948, 954 (1983).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 955-56.
68. Id. at 956.
69. Id. The Court also stated that, even if the school board's previous selective
granting of access to the system created a limited public forum, the constitutional
right of access would extend only to similar community organizations and not to a
teacher union. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 956-57.
72. Id. at 957.
73. Id.
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merely permitted PEA, as exclusive bargaining representa-
tive for all district teachers, to use the mail system for its
school-related business. There was "no indication that the
school board intended to discourage one viewpoint and ad-
vance another." 74
The Court then determined whether the school board's
status distinction was "reasonable in light of the purpose
which the forum at issue serves. ' 75 Access to the mail sys-
tem enabled PEA to perform the "continuing and difficult"
tasks associated with collective bargaining and labor repre-
sentation; PLEA had no such "official responsibility. ' 76 The
differential access may also have ensured labor peace within
the schools.77 Furthermore, PLEA had access to substantial
alternative channels of communication which it had not
shown to be inadequate.78 Therefore, the differential access
provided PEA and PLEA was a reasonable means of pre-
serving the mail system for school-related business. 79
The Supreme Court also rejected the argument that dif-
ferential access to a nonpublic forum violated the equal pro-
tection clause 0 Since PLEA had no right of access to the
mail system, the grant of such access to PEA did not burden
a fundamental right of PLEA.8 ' Thus, "[tihe school district's
policy need only rationally further a legitimate state pur-
pose. That purpose is clearly found in the special responsi-
bilities of an exclusive bargaining representative." 82
B. The Dissent
Justice Brennan dissented, 3 focusing on the effect of the
74. Id.
75. Id. at 957 (footnote omitted).
76. Id. at 958-59.
77. Id. at 959.
78. Id. The Court noted the alternative channels and the fact that all unions
would be treated equally during elections, stating: "These means range from bulletin
boards to meeting facilities to the United States mail. During election periods, PLEA
is assured of equal access to all modes of communication." Id.
79. Id. at 958.
80. Id. at 959.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 960 (citation omitted).
83. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 103 S. Ct. 948, 960 (1983)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
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exclusive access policy. He maintained that the first amend-
ment prohibits censorship in the form of viewpoint discrimi-
nation in any forum.84 The dissent argued that PEA's status
was irrelevant when determining the existence of govern-
mental discrimination, and that intentional viewpoint dis-
crimination could be inferred from the effect of the exclusive
access policy and other facts.8 - The court of appeals found
that the access policy favored a particular viewpoint on la-
bor relations.8 6 The only logical reason for PEA to negotiate
an exclusive access provision was to deny rival unions access
to an effective means of communication. 7 The majority's
labor peace justification itself indicates an intent to suppress
opposing viewpoints. 8
The dissent then subjected the justifications for the policy
to rigorous scrutiny.Y9 Justice Brennan acknowledged the
importance of PEA's status as exclusive bargaining represen-
tative and the state's interest in efficient communication be-
tween labor representatives and their members. 90 Despite
this, he found these considerations to be insufficient justifica-
tion for the exclusive-access policy.91 He determined this
policy to be "overinclusive" as a means of serving the state's
interest because PEA's use was not strictly limited to per-
formance of its special representative duties. He also consid-
ered the policy to be "underinclusive" because outside
community organizations with no special duties to the teach-
ers were permitted to use the mail system.92 Justice Brennan
found the policy invalid because it furthered no substantial
state interest.93 There was neither evidence that the previous
84. Id. at 961.
85. Id. at 965.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 966.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. The dissent noted that even if the access policy were more closely tailored
in these two respects, "the fit would still be questionable, for it might be difficult -
both in practice and in principle - effectively to separate 'necessary' communications
from propaganda." Id. (quoting Perry Local Educators' Ass'n v. Hohlt, 652 F.2d
1286, 1300 (7th Cir. 1981)).
93. Perry Education, 103 S. Ct. at 967 (Brennan, J, dissenting). "While the
[school] board may have a legitimate interest in granting [PEA] access to the system,
1984]
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equal access policy affected disruption within the schools nor
an indication that any such labor instability would result.94
Moreover, the mere existence of alternative channels of
communication, far inferior channels in this case, did not
support an abridgement of one's freedom of speech.95
Therefore, the differential access provided PEA and PLEA
violated the first amendment.96
IV. ANALYSIS
The majority's rigid approach to the issue of union access
to school communication facilities precludes examination of
the underlying realities. In its public forum analysis, the
Court argued that the mail system was properly opened to
only PEA because PEA "assumed an official position in the
operational structure of the District's schools." 97 Vhile it is
true that PEA was the recognized bargaining representative
in the district, such status should not be characterized as an
"official position." The exclusive access policy did not ac-
company certification as collective bargaining agent. In-
stead, it resulted from negotiation of a labor contract. 98 Had
such a provision not been agreed upon, access to the school's
mail facilities could have been denied to PEA.99 Therefore,
the policy was not justified by PEA's "official" status.
Rather, PEA's status was "official" because of the policy.
Since PEA's status itself did not demand a right of ac-
cess, it is clear that the school board's grant of exclusive ac-
cess was an abridgement of PLEA's freedom of speech based
on the rival union's identity. The board's selective access
policy amplified PEA's speech by discriminatorily opening a
channel of communication to the union, while repressing
it has no legitimate interest in making that access exclusive by denying access to
[PLEA]." Id.
94. Id. at 968. "In addition, there is no reason to assume that [PLEA's] messages
would be any more likely to cause labor discord when received by members of the
majority union than [PEA's] messages would when received by the [minority union]."
Id.
95. Id. at 968-69 n.13.
96. Id. at 969.
97. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 103 S. Ct. 948, 957 n.9
(1983).
98. Id. at 952.
99. See id. at 957.
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PLEA's speech by denying it equal access.lco The trouble-
some fact in Perry Education is that the school board was not
motivated by a desire to censor opposing views but rather
only acquiesced in PEA's contract demands.' 0' This fact de-
termined the majority's choice of the lower standard of re-
view and, ultimately, the outcome of the case.w2 However,
by agreeing to an access provision motivated by a desire to
repress speech, the school board constructively acknowl-
edged its intent to engage in de facto viewpoint discrimina-
tion. Under these circumstances, the compelling interest
standard of review is required. 0 3
Nevertheless, the crucial inquiry prompted by Justice
White's majority opinion is whether or not the public prop-
erty at issue constitutes a public forum.'°4 If the property is
a nonpublic forum, the government may grant access for ex-
pression to some groups while denying it to others as long as
the state shows a reasonable basis for the differential treat-
ment and there is no proof of an overt discriminatory moti-
vation by the state. 0 5
The Supreme Court's focus could have three important
consequences for the collective bargaining process in the
public school system. First, school boards may use nonpub-
lic forums as bargaining tools. In exchange for certain con-
cessions, boards could grant access to teacher mailboxes or
an interschool mail system, provide an empty room for office
purposes or grant telephone privileges. Boards could also
strictly regulate the use of these forums or allow unre-
strained use. Second, incumbent unions could use such ac-
cess to entrench their representative positions. "[T]he
teachers inevitably will receive from [the incumbent union]
self-laudatory descriptions of its activities on their behalf
and will be denied the critical perspective offered by the [ri-
val union]. ' 0 6 Third, rival unions, unless monetarily power-
100. Id. at 966 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
101. See 103 S. Ct. at 957; id. at 968 n.12 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
102. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
103. 103 S. Ct. at 966 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Perry Local Educators'
Ass'n v. Hohlt, 652 F.2d 1286, 1293-96 (7th Cir. 1981); Comment, supra note 27.
104. See Perry Education, 103 S. Ct. at 955.
105. Id. at 955, 957.
106. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n v. Hohlt, 652 F.2d 1286, 1296 (7th Cir. 1981).
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ful, 10 7 may abandon attempts to challenge the incumbents.
Alternative channels of communication, such as telephon-
ing, public mailing, or notice posting, are more expensive,
more time consuming, and more likely to be missed than the
channel used by the incumbent union.10 8
V. CONCLUSION
In Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educators'
Association 10 9 the United States Supreme Court held that a
school board could grant the recognized teacher union ex-
clusive access to the school system's internal mail facilities.
The Court deferred to the wisdom of the school board. It
narrowly focused on the character of the public property and
passively scrutinized the justifications for the exclusive ac-
cess policy. The likely consequences of such deference are
de facto viewpoint discrimination and less competition
among and examination of collective bargaining units.
However, these effects can be prevented while at the
same time allowing local school districts the discretion to
provide or deny access to labor unions. State legislatures
can enact statutes guaranteeing teacher unions equal treat-
ment with regard to rights of access. 10 This equal access
policy promotes uniformity within school districts and re-
solves the important constitutional issues addressed in Perry
Education.
DAVID C. SARNACKI
107. See generally Gee, supra note 13; Levine & Lewis, The Status of Collective
Bargaining in Public Education: An Overview, 33 LAB. L.J. 177 (1982).
108. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n v. Hohlt, 652 F.2d 1286, 1299 (7th Cir. 1981).
109. 103 S. Ct. 948 (1983).
110. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-153d(b) (1983), which provides: "All orga-
nizations seeking to represent members of the teaching profession shall be accorded
equal treatment with respect to access to... mail boxes and school facilities. .. ."
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